Various possible explanations for the turnout increase of nearly 6 percentage points in the 1992 U.S. presidential election as compared to the 1988 election are examined, using both survey and state-level data. The turnout impact of Perot's candidacy, surprisingly, is found to be negligible. Neither is support found for views frequently expressed in the media that the economic recession and MTV's 'Rock the Vote' registration campaign aimed at young people played substantial roles in stimulating additional voter participation. Only a small fraction of the turnout rise can be attributed to the spread and maturation of 'motor voter' registration programs at the state level between the 1988 and 1992 elections. The mystery is 'resolved' in part by evidence that, from the perspective of recent history, the low turnout of 1988 is at least as great an anomaly as the high turnout of 1992. Unfortunately, there are few clues as to what factors peculiar to the 1988 elections led turnout to be so low in that year.
INTRODUCTION
The post-1960 decline in voter turnout in U.S. presidential elections has been analyzed extensively by Teixeira (1992) and others. The election of 1984 was the first since 1960 to show an increase from the preceding presidential year, but this small rise was followed in 1988 by a record low. The 1992 election, however, saw a return to 1970s-level participation, with 55.9% of the voting age population casting ballots, compared to only 50.1% in 1988. Whether this increase was temporary, or indicative of a counter-trend, depends in large part on whether higher turnout was a product of election-specific factors such as Ross Perot's candidacy, or of more permanent changes such as the trend toward easier voter registration.
Related to these issues is that of whether higher turnout added to Clinton's margin of victory. If the 1992 turnout signalled a trend, and if Democrats really do benefit from higher participation at the expense of Republicans, the prospects of Democratic candidates in future races may be improved. Evidence is mixed, however, on whether higher-turnout elections have in the past have actually favored Democrats on balance (Erikson, 1995; Radcliff, 1995 Radcliff, , 1994 DeNardo, 1980; Tucker and Vedlitz, 1986 ). This paper explores the possible role in accounting for the turnout rise of several factors commonly cited both before and after the 1992 election as positive influences on participation rates.
Attention is focused primarily on the Perot candidacy, the recession, MTV's 'Rock the Vote' campaign targeted at young people, and new 'motor voter' provisions adopted by many states making it easier to register. Curtis Gans, director of the Committee for the Study of the American Electorate, claimed that 'the entire increase in participation can be traced to Ross Perot's candidacy' (Newsday, November 10, 1992) . Patrick Lippert, then executive director of 'Rock the Vote,' boasted after the election that 'two million more young people voted' (Washington Post, January 19, 1993, C3) as a result of the MTV-sponsored campaign to raise turnout among the young, who historically in the U.S. have voted at very low rates. This paper explores whether the turnout rise can be statistically explained by these factors.
METHODOLOGY
Several of these factors can be analyzed using state-level data on turnout. Using a pooled time-series, cross-section model of turnout in presidential elections over the 1976-92 period permits tests of the impact of Perot's candidacy, motor voter, the recession, and other variables alleged to have helped produce the rise in voter participation. This model controls for 'resource' variables such as education and income included in many turnout studies (e.g., Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993) , and 'mobilization' variables such as the presence of Senate and gubernatorial races on the ballot (Caldeira, Patterson, and Markko, 1985; Boyd, 1986) .
Time-series, cross-section data also permit the use of fixed state and year effects. In models with fixed state effects, coefficients are estimated exploiting only within-state variation over time. Fixed state effects control for important otherwise unmeasurable turnout determinants varying substantially across states but very little over time, which may be correlated with the variables of interest. These models are far more useful for testing hypotheses regarding variables exhibiting large variation over time --such as the Perot vote share, unemployment, and motor voter programs that are the focus of this analysis --as opposed to variables such as registration closing date and demographic characteristics, which change relatively little over the 1976-92 period. (See Stimson, 1985 , for further explanation of fixed-effects models.) Table 1 reports results from these tests of state-level turnout. Weighted least squares (with voting-age population as the weight variable) is used to correct for heteroskedasticity, as the error variance in state-level turnout models is found to be significantly and inversely correlated with voting-age population in tests using OLS.
[TABLE 1 HERE]
The major 'resource' variable, percent of the over-25 population with a high-school diploma, is positively and significantly associated with turnout in Table 1 . Each 3-percentage point rise in the diploma rate is associated with a turnout rise of 1 percentage point. Increases in per capita income also increase state turnout. Increases in the number of recent movers, as measured by the percentage of residents living at their current address less than 5 years, are associated with reduced turnout, as expected, but this effect is also not significant. Similarly, increases in the percentage of adults who are less than 25 years old lower turnout, but not significantly so. i Turnout is nearly 2 percentage points higher on average (significant at .05) when there is a gubernatorial race on the ballot. The presence of a Senate race on the ballot has a much smaller and insignificant effect. These results are both consistent with those of Boyd (1986) , who uses survey data.
Among registration-law variables, the adoption of mail-in registration is associated with a nearly 2-percentage-point rise in turnout. Registration closing date has the anticipated negative sign but is not significant.
Limited variation over time within states in the demographic variables, and in registration closing date, may be responsible for their lack of statistical significance. Variation over time is very high, however, in the variables tested in Table 1 which are alleged to have played a role in the turnout rise, making the fixed-effects model an appropriate one for testing their turnout impacts.
These factors include the Perot candidacy, the recession, motor voter, term limit initiatives, and election closeness, which are considered in turn below. Evidence from Voter Research and Surveys (VRS), the National Elections Studies (NES), the Census Bureau's Current Population Survey, and other data sources will be used to supplement the state-level results in Survey evidence provides little support, however, for the belief that there is a large pool of eligible voters who abstain out of a disgust with politics. In most past elections, NES respondents who believe that government officials are crooked, or that they can't be trusted, are no less likely to vote than other respondents (Miller and Traugott, 1989, p. 308 The PEROT coefficient is actually negative, although not statistically significant.
Most of the estimates derived from various procedures and data sources thus provide little support for the proposition that Perot's candidacy was the primary factor in raising turnout in the '92
election. This conclusion is consistent with that of Rosenstone et al. (1993) , who report that Perot supporters among respondents in the 1992 NES were no more likely to vote or to participate in the campaign than were non-supporters, and that Perot's campaign had personally contacted less than 3% of the electorate.
Nevertheless, it is possible that Perot's candidacy influenced the outcome of the presidential election. Any 'direct' effects on the Clinton-Bush vote distribution were minor, if the exit polls can be believed: Perot voters split almost evenly between Clinton (38%) and Bush (37%) when asked their second choice. 'Indirect' effects of Perot's candidacy on the candidate choices of the 80% of voters who chose Clinton or Bush are more uncertain: Perot may have changed the dynamics of the race by focusing primarily on Bush's rather than Clinton's weaknesses.
THE RECESSION
A sluggish economy was widely credited in the media for stimulating interest in the election, and for playing a role in the turnout rise. As with the case of third-party candidacies, history suggests skepticism regarding voter participation effects of recession. Turnout fell in 1980 relative to 1976, despite a third major candidacy and a national unemployment rate of 7.5% --identical to the fall 1992 jobless rate.
Moreover, Rosenstone (1982) has found a negative effect of unemployment on turnout in a U.S. time-series model of elections from 1948-80: a 1-point rise in the short-term (< 5 weeks) unemployment rate reduces turnout by an estimated 2.8 percentage points. Using the total unemployment rate, however, Rosenstone obtains a smaller and statistically insignificant coefficient.
The 'unemployment rate' variable in Table 1 is the total unemployment rate by state, averaged over the election year. Its coefficient indicates that a 1 percentage point rise in a state's total unemployment rate pushes up turnout by a statistically insignificant one-fourteenth of one percentage point. Applying this estimate to the country as a whole, the rise in the national unemployment rate from 5.4% in 1988 to 7.5% in 1992 implies a turnout increase of only one-seventh of a percentage point.
To the extent the recession had little or no impact on turnout, Clinton's support was not dependent on the participation of new voters registering economic discontent by voting against the incumbent. Any such turnout effects were doubtless dwarfed by the number of voters who would have turned out anyway, regardless of prevailing economic conditions, who switched their votes from Bush to another candidate because they blamed him for the recession.
Clinton rather than Perot appears to have been the chief beneficiary of recession-related discontent with Bush's performance. Clinton's vote share is positively correlated with state-level unemployment rates, but Perot's is not in simple cross-sectional regressions that also control for a Southern regional dummy and percent black population. Exit polls from VRS found that 56% of unemployed respondents voted for Clinton, while Perot's 20% support among this group barely exceeded his overall performance.
MTV'S 'ROCK THE VOTE' Campaign
From exit polling of a random sample of voters in 1988 and 1992, coupled with U.S.
Census data on the age distribution of the population, Voter Research and Surveys estimates that turnout for the 18-29 age group rose by 12% relative to 1988. Attributing the entire increase in turnout within this age group to MTV's campaign is highly suspect, however. While turnout among the young rose 12%, overall turnout rose by 9.5% (i.e., about 5 percentage points).
Even crediting the difference between these two increases to 'Rock the Vote' may be overly generous. Turnout in the 30-44 and 45-59 age groups rose by 11% and 12%, respectively; only for the oldest (60+) group was the turnout rise substantially lower (at 2%) than for the 18-to 29-year-olds. Furthermore, the increases for the 30-44 and 45-59 groups were from a larger base, as those groups --unlike the young --already voted at high rates. For example, a 12% increase from a base of about 40% turnout for young persons implies a 4.8 percentage-point increase, to 44.8. The same 12% rise from a base of 60% for middle-aged persons implies a 7.2 percentage-point rise, to 67.2% turnout.
This arithmetic indicates that the turnout rise in the under-30 category represented only about one-twelfth of the maximum possible rise, while the increase in the 45-59 category was nearly one-fifth of the maximum possible rise. While there were about 2 million more voters aged 18 to 29 in 1992 compared to 1988, by these estimates, this age group failed to pull its weight: it comprises over one-fourth of the voting age population, but accounted for only about one-sixth of the 12 million-plus total increase in turnout. November 1992 shows larger increases in turnout for younger age groups, but these estimates are also based on self-reports, or the reports of family members (see Table A in Jennings, 1993) .
Perhaps 'Rock the Vote' succeeded in making young people more embarrassed to admit not having voted, but not in actually getting them to the polls.
Even if the assumption were made that the NES and CPS self-reports of turnout are more accurate than estimates based on exit polls, and this disproportionate increase in turnout among the young is attributable entirely to 'Rock the Vote,' the MTV-sponsored campaign would still account only for a tiny fraction of the nearly 6-point rise in the aggregate turnout rate. If the difference between the 6.6 percentage point increase in turnout among 18-24 year olds indicated in the Census figures and the 3.3% rise indicated for the other age groups combined were credited entirely to 'Rock the Vote,' that would account for only about 750,000 young voters --far short of Lippert's claim of two million. Given the Census estimates of a total of nearly 114 million votes and of an overall turnout of 61.3%, three-quarters of a million votes represents less than one-half of one percentage point of turnout.
Even if the increase in 1992 turnout, relative to 1988, among young people is not simply an artifact of increased 'overreporting,' the increase may well be due to factors other than 'Rock the Vote.' The CPS data reported in Jennings (1993, Exit polls clearly indicate that Clinton's margin over Bush among young voters was much greater than his overall margin (see Table 2 ). Any increase in turnout among the young may thus have contributed to his victory. This outcome is ironic given that the campaign to place warning labels on music with offensive lyrics was led by Tipper Gore, the wife of Clinton's running mate, and that the inspiration for 'Rock the Vote' was the supposed threat of censorship represented by this campaign.
[TABLE 2 HERE]
THE SPREAD OF 'MOTOR VOTER' PROGRAMS
Perot's candidacy, the recession and 'Rock the Vote' are each election-specific variables that may be irrelevant for turnout levels in future elections. Passage of the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) in the spring of 1993, however, may represent a permanent upward force on turnout.
The NVRA is popularly known as the 'motor voter' bill, as its provision for registering voters at driver's license bureaus is widely expected to be its most effective feature --as an analysis of such programs already in effect in many states has found (Knack, 1995 rise that is attributable to motor voter will not only be permanent, but will be augmented by many more such programs.
Using data for the 1976-92 period, Knack (1995) shows that 'active' motor voter substantially raises registration rates, and raises turnout to a more modest degree (estimated turnout effects are larger for midterm than for presidential-year elections). That study introduces a 'duration'-based specification for motor voter, coded as the number of elections since implementation of a program. This specification allows motor voter's impact to increase with time, as more of a state's voting-age population has the opportunity to register when applying for a driver's license, or license renewal, the longer the program has been in effect. A simple dummy variable specification would underestimate the eventual impact of motor voter, by coding new programs the same as mature programs that have reached more drivers. The square of the duration term is also included in turnout equations, reflecting the fact that the marginal effect of time diminishes as eventually all driver's license renewal applicants will have had prior opportunities to register via motor voter.
Using the data from Knack (1995) , the model in Table 1 
TERM LIMIT INITIATIVES
An additional election-specific event to address is the term limit movement, which succeeded in placing initiatives on the ballot in 14 states --and in winning approval of all of them.
Conceivably, this issue helped to push up participation rates, as angry voters mobbed to the polls to voice their protest against politics-as-usual: More than 230 state issues ranging from term limits to mandatory health insurance and curbs on gay rights were on Tuesday's ballots. But none was as incendiary as the fire storm of demands for restrictions on the number of terms elected officials can serve. Not since citizen initiatives first appeared on state ballots in 1898 has an issue so galvanized Americans. (Time, Nov. 16, 1992, p. 22) However, the 14 term limit states fail to show a significantly higher turnout rate than the other 37, either in simple cross-sectional tests, or in the time-series cross-sectional model of Table 1 .
Was the Perot candidacy partially responsible for the 14-state sweep by term limit proponents? Perot conceivably inspired many alienated voters to go to the polls, aiding the throw-the-bums-out campaign. iv Little support is found for this thesis: among the 14 term limit states, there is a positive but moderate (.32) and insignificant correlation between the Perot vote share and the percentage of 'Yes' votes on term limitation.
'POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT'
Beginning with The American Voter (Campbell et. al., 1960) The most dramatic increases in 'involvement' as evidenced by the 1992 NES were in the number of respondents indicating they were 'very interested in the campaign' (from 27.8% to 38.8%; see Table 3 ) and who indicated they cared a lot about the outcome of the presidential race (61% to 74.8%). Sizeable increases also are shown in Table 3 in the sense of 'civic duty' to vote (as indicated by agreement with the statement that one should vote even if one doesn't care who wins) and in 'efficacy' (measured by agreement with the statement 'people like me have a say' in government. The percentages of respondents reporting that they were 'very interested' in the campaign and cared about the outcome were extraordinarily high not only relative to 1988, but from a historical perspective (see the time-series descriptive statistics of these items in Teixeira, 1992, pp. 41, 44) . However, the wording of the 'care' question was changed between the 1988 and 1992 surveys, making it impossible to establish whether or not concern over election outcomes really increased among Americans. Specifically, respondents in 1988 were asked 'would you say you personally care a good deal which party wins the presidential election.' In 1988 'who' was substituted for 'which party.'
[ Using these estimates from Table 4 , in conjunction with data on changes in the means of these variables from 1988 to 1992 in the first two columns of Table 3 , the sources of the turnout rise are decomposed in the third column of Table 3 The bulk of the 6-point turnout rise can thus be 'explained' by increases in measures of psychological involvement in politics that are correlated with turnout. Explaining behavioral involvement (turnout) in terms of psychological involvement, however, comes close to being true by definition...The American Voter and its trailing literature do not give us an explicit theory of political motivation that could serve to account for voter turnout/abstention below a surface level (Dennis, 1991, p. 26) .
As Fiorina (1981) warns: 'Statistical explanation is not identical to substantive explanation.'
From a theoretic standpoint, there is something profoundly unsatisfying about attributing turnout trends to variations in sense of efficacy, partisanship, and reading newspaper articles about the campaign. What accounts for these variations? As Teixeira, one of the foremost practitioners of this approach to turnout change, has acknowledged more recently, 'this type of analysis does not reveal where these proximate factors came from... ' (1992, ch. 2) . To the extent that variables such as heightened interest, concern over the outcome, and efficacy played a role in the turnout rise, improvement in these 'attitudes' is apparently largely unrelated to Perot's candidacy, 'Rock the Vote,' the recession, and term limits --as none of these phenomena can be strongly linked to turnout.
If 'Rock the Vote' stimulated interest among young people in the political campaign, presumably there would be evidence in the survey data. In fact, there is a sizeable increase in the proportion of under-30 NES respondents who claimed to have been 'very much interested' in the campaign and who cared about the outcome. However, these 12.7 and 16.6 percentage-point rises in interest and concern respectively are nearly matched by 11.0 and 13.8-point rises among all NES respondents (Table 3) . Civic duty rose slightly more for the under-30 group, but efficacy rose less among young people than in the whole NES sample, and strength of partisan identification fell more for the young than for the over-30 group (Table 3) .
The closeness issue can also be re-examined with the benefit of NES survey data. In 1992, 79% of the NES sample expected the presidential election to be close, compared to only 70% in 1988 (Table 3) . This survey measure is sometimes uncorrelated with turnout in the NES, for example in 1984. Perceived closeness is significantly correlated with turnout in both 1988 and 1992, however, with a coefficient in the pooled regression of 5.22% (Table 4 ). Employing this coefficient as an upper-bound estimate of the closeness-turnout partial correlation, an increase in perceived closeness can account for up to a one-half percentage point rise in turnout in this model from 1988 to 1992. This estimate does not materially alter the conclusion reached above that a closer election in 1992 was responsible for only a small portion of the turnout rise.
The NES also asks whether respondents expect the presidential contest to be close within their own state. The proportion expecting close contests within their state rose only from .59 to .61 from the 1988 to the 1992 survey. The point estimate for the impact of this variable when added to the Table 4 model is a statistically insignificant .5, only one-tenth that of the NES item measuring perceived closeness in the race at the national level. This evidence is consistent with that obtained from the state-level model.
'STAKES' IN THE ELECTION
The Downsian voting model as formalized by Tullock (1967, ch. 7) and by Riker and Ordeshook (1968) has been interpreted as implying that the greater the perceived difference between the two candidates, the greater the incentive to vote. As Downs (1957, ch. 13 ) himself originally noted, the infinitesimal probability that an individual voter is decisive suggests that these 'instrumental' benefits will not exceed the costs of voting, so that a rational choice framework is consistent with the decision to vote only if something like 'civic duty' or other private benefits to voting are introduced into the model. Nevertheless, greater differences between the two candidates may increase the incentives to vote as perceived by voters with an exaggerated subjective probability of being decisive. Or, greater differences between the two candidates may generate greater mobilization efforts on the part of groups (including party organizations) with stakes in the outcome that are collectively large enough to justify expending resources on invoking group participatory norms (Uhlaner, 1989) .
Distances between an individual's position in policy space and those of the candidates may also influence turnout decisions. 'Alienation' may lead some voters to abstain, as neither candidate comes sufficiently close to their preferences to motivate them to go to the polls. Alternatively, some people may be more likely to vote if they fear victory by a particular candidate: aversion to a candidate perceived as dangerous may motivate their participation. Measures representing each of these three concepts were created from NES ideology items which asked the respondent to place him-or herself and each of the major candidates on a 7-point scale ranging from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. For the candidate differential measure, the distances between Bush and Dukakis (1988) and between Bush and Clinton (1992) Only the candidate differential measure is statistically significant and in the hypothesized direction.
The aversion measure fails to show the hypothesized sign.
Changes in the means of these three measures between 1988 and 1992 in the NES are reported in Table 3 . Even with Perot in the race, NES respondents on average were no closer to their preferred candidate in issue space in 1992 than in 1988, using this one-dimensional issue space of political ideology. On average, respondents were 1.06 places away from their preferred candidate on the ideology scale in both elections (Table 3) . Thus, there is no evidence that 'alienation' as defined in terms of distance from voter's ideal points diminished from one election to the other, or that alienation-based abstention exists in the first place. These findings undermine the basic rationale behind the belief that Perot's candidacy should have increased turnout. vii. All three variables are positive for every respondent, as they are measured in distances along the 7-point scale. For voters, the preferred candidate is the one they reported voting for. Nonvoters were asked which candidate they preferred.
viii . This regression contained only 1923 observations, as many respondents could not place themselves on this 7-point scale, or could do so only upon further prompting (those cases were dropped as being insufficiently reliable).
ix. One might expect that the 'care' item is highly collinear with these three 'stakes' variables. Correlations of each with the 'care' item are all very modest, and deleting 'care' from the turnout regression changes coefficients for these three variables only trivially. As a dichotomous variable, 'care' may be an insufficiently fine measure to capture much of the variation in the three interval-scale 'stakes' variables. 'Care' also likely encompasses character and competency evaluations, as well as policy preferences not captured by the ideology scale.
